Hamas’s strategic survival drives Israel crazy

The release of three Israeli female prisoners in Gaza by Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, in exchange for 90 Palestinian detainees, triggered a media frenzy in the occupation state.

The dramatic “scene” – fighters emerging amidst the ruins of war, surrounded by a jubilant crowd – undermined official Israeli narratives about the war, its goals, and the treatment of Israeli captives. It raised a sobering question for Israelis: What were we doing in Gaza for 15 months?

The Qassam Brigades orchestrated every detail of the event to maximize impact. From the branded gift bags to the polished uniforms of the fighters, the display exuded calculated precision. A military procession was even held in Saraya Square – an area heavily besieged by Israeli occupation forces. The site’s selection was deliberate, showcasing continued resilience in a location meant to symbolize Tel Aviv’s defeat in its longest military campaign ever. 

Sources in Hamas inform The Cradle that the selection of Gaza City – positioned north of the Gaza Valley and the Netzarim axis, a divide created by the Israeli army to split the strip into two sections, soon expected to be dismantled – was a deliberate and symbolic decision, chosen over other alternatives for its strategic and political implications.

Of course, Hamas had the option to release the female prisoners in “safer” locations, such as central or southern Gaza, but it intentionally chose the square.

Strength through strategy

The delay in handing over the three Israeli prisoners for several hours caused confusion among Israelis, leading to multiple violations of the ceasefire agreement. The Qassam Brigades then surprised the Israeli public by announcing the prisoners’ names before the Israeli government, military, or Hebrew media could do so. Minor logistical issues also briefly delayed the release of the 90 male and female Palestinian prisoners but were quickly resolved.

The three Israeli captives were handed release certificates in both Hebrew and Arabic – mirroring Israeli practices with Palestinian prisoners – and were given souvenirs from Gaza, including a detailed map of the entire strip. According to the sources, these “deliberate and carefully planned steps” were intended to send a clear message to Israel: Hamas is neither defeated nor on the brink of elimination.

Israel’s Channel 12 called the ceasefire agreement a “bag of sarcastic surprises,” but the prisoner exchange’s strength lay elsewhere. For months, Israeli negotiators had tried through Qatari and Egyptian mediation – and failed – to extract a list of the Palestinian prisoners to be freed. 

Hamas refused, citing security risks, and forced Israel to pay a far higher price than in earlier deals. The initial truce on 24 November 2023 saw three Palestinians exchanged per Israeli. Now, after 15 grueling months of war, Israel had to release 10 times that ratio, a clear indication of Tel Aviv’s lost leverage.

That first, brief six-day truce gave Palestinian resistance factions a chance to regroup. Sources reveal that several battalions, battered by relentless Israeli bombings, managed to regain their operational footing during the break. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pushed for continuous pressure without any pause in Israel’s brutal military campaign, the short truce showed Hamas was resilient enough to spring back into form quickly.

Did Hamas achieve victory in Gaza? 

All of this raises the central question: Did Hamas achieve victory in Gaza, and if so, how and why? To answer fully, one must first analyze the foundational and evolving sources of the resistance movement’s strength, examine the mechanisms behind its adaptability and renewal, and finally consider who currently leads the organization, particularly within the Gaza Strip.

Hamas today remains deeply present not only in the Palestinian street but also across the broader Arab and Islamic worlds. Despite the devastation of war, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which was launched on 7 October 2023, continues to resonate strongly, shaping public and personal sentiment across the globe. Moreover, sources tell The Cradle that these events have fueled significant recruitment, with thousands of young Palestinians joining Hamas’s ranks. 

Even Hebrew media, despite its often propagandistic tone, has acknowledged this phenomenon. While much of Israel’s narrative aims to justify prolonged conflict or the potential resumption of war, occasional admissions reveal the growing appeal of resistance among Palestinians.

Hamas sources argue that Israel has created “a vendetta for generations,” describing the war as not merely a battle against the resistance movement, but a war on all citizens of Gaza. The widespread massacres and destruction have unified the Palestinian street, blurring distinctions between Hamas supporters and others. 

“Those who are not part of Hamas inevitably become part of the resistance,” one source explains, emphasizing that even if Hamas were to cease, a new and perhaps stronger movement would emerge in its stead.

A European security official reportedly shared similar concerns with a Hamas representative in Lebanon. The official warned that Gaza’s estimated 18,000 orphans, created by this war alone, could form a new “liberation army” within a decade, one even fiercer than its predecessors. 

Adaptability and strategic learning 

Hamas has leveraged this dire situation for reconstruction and renewal, refining its strategies and operations. By the sixth month of the war, it was evident that its focus extended beyond ammunition and weaponry to the cultivation of leadership and cadres. 

The Qassam Brigades has prioritized the safety of fighters and the efficiency of operations, ensuring that resources are not squandered and that retreat paths remain secure. Israel’s starvation policy, particularly in northern Gaza, aimed to weaken resistance fighters by restricting vital nutritional elements like animal proteins. Despite these tactics, Hamas adapted swiftly, mitigating the impact through preemptive measures. 

Another critical factor in Hamas’s resilience is its systematic approach to leadership development. Before the war, its military arms, particularly the Qassam Brigades, operated training programs and maintained a semi-official military academy. 

This structure allowed the group to maintain high-caliber leadership despite the assassination of many of the movement’s commanders. Expertise in manufacturing weapons and missiles was rapidly transferred, ensuring continuity in operations. 

Intel warfare 

Hamas’s intelligence apparatus also played a pivotal role, in which “secrecy” was maintained over key information. Sources tell The Cradle that the movement’s security infrastructure, including the intelligence arm of the Qassam Brigades, General Security, and Internal Security, was critical in preserving the organization’s structure and integrity throughout the war. 

“As long as the security apparatus is strong, the movement will endure,” one source notes. Even as Israeli forces targeted intelligence members, Hamas adapted, employing thousands, securing prisoners, and transferring money – within its existing security frameworks and new methods developed during the war. 

The resistance movement also demonstrated remarkable counterintelligence capabilities. Israeli forces, dissatisfied with their aerial and technical surveillance, resorted to storming locations not just for military gains but to install surveillance equipment to try to fill their intel gaps. Meanwhile, Hamas prioritized operational secrecy, closely monitoring journalists and photographers among displaced communities to prevent leaks that could endanger fighters or their families. The source explains it thus:

“As long as the security apparatus is present and strong, the movement will remain fine … It does not matter how weak it is militarily, politically, or even financially; what is important is that security remains fine. After months of military combat, the battle turned into an intelligence war, specifically between the Qassam Intelligence and the Shin Bet.”

Leadership in Gaza: Who leads Hamas? 

Following the martyrdom of Yahya Sinwar – the powerful and intelligent Hamas leader and ‘architect’ of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood – the resistance movement refrained from announcing a new political bureau chief, leaving questions about its leadership unanswered. The Cradle sources confirm, however, that the movement is currently governed by a five-member committee representing Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora, with Musa Abu Marzouk playing a key role in international relations. 

Israeli media has frequently speculated about the role of Mohammad Sinwar, Yahya’s brother, portraying him as a central, uncompromising figure in Hamas’s decision-making. The younger Sinwar’s life is no less mysterious than that of the Qassam Brigades Military Commander Mohammed Deif, and he has also been subjected to six assassination attempts during the last 30 years. 

While Mohammad Sinwar lacks a political or security background, his expertise as a brigade and operations commander has made him a formidable figure in Gaza’s resistance. Reports suggest that during negotiations, Israel even proposed deporting the younger Sinwar to resolve the conflict – an offer Hamas dismissed. 

Although Israeli reports often personalize and exaggerate leadership roles – often right before an assassination attempt – insiders stress that Hamas operates as an institution, not as a personality-driven movement. This institutional framework has been key to its resilience, enabling it to withstand external pressure and internal challenges. 

Despite the devastation wrought by the war, Hamas has succeeded in fortifying its institutional framework and maintaining cohesion – a rare feat among Palestinian factions. While Yahya Sinwar’s leadership during pivotal operations, such as Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, demonstrates the movement’s strategic acumen, the true source of Hamas’s strength lies in its collective and institutional structure. This framework has enabled it to endure even the most extreme challenges.

Without this institutional resilience, Hamas’s gains would likely have disintegrated early in the conflict, handing the occupation state the decisive political victory it sought – a victory that remains unattained.