Does England Hate Russia? England, Truman and the Greek Connexion.

By William Mallinson

Introduction 

This paper will attempt to demonstrate that England (and later the United Kingdom) has a deep historical dislike of Russia, and even of the Russian people, explaining why. Starting with William Pitt’s verbal attack on Russia in 1791, it will move onto the Dardanelles, the so-called ‘Great Game’, the Crimean War, the acquisition of Cyprus, Mackinder’s obsession with Russia, the Bolsheviks, the Fourth World War, the Greek Civil War, and the Cold War, finishing by considering recent attacks on Russia by British politicians. The paper will also bring out Britain’s use of Greece to stir up anti-Soviet flames. The paper’s main argument is that individual characteristics such as atavism, nostalgia, arrogance, envy, racism and what we term ‘post-imperial rigor mortis’ are key factors in explaining the English and then British attitude. 

Be that as it may, there have of course been periods of peaceful co-existence and alliances between the two countries. For example, Ivan the Terrible established ‘friendly and profitable’ relations with England;[1] Britain and Russia were also allies at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, while the Great Game (see below) came to a reasonable end with a treaty with Russia, in 1907, that reconciled the differences between the two countries in Asia. Tibet was neutralised; Russia gave up her interest in Afghanistan, and left control of that country’s foreign policy in Britain’s hands; and Persia was divided into a Russian zone, a neutral one, and a British one. The Great Game had seemingly been brought to an end.[2] In the Great War, London and Moscow were allies until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and of course after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. But it would do well to remember Palmerston: ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’ 

Before analysing British policy towards Russia, let us indulge ourselves with a few examples of recent emotional attacks on Russia: as Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson called for people to demonstrate outside the Russian Embassy; more recently, Foreign Secretary David Lammy, directly accused Vladimir Putin of running a ‘mafia state’, likening him to a slave-owner[3]; and Lizz Truss, when Foreign Secretary, stated that she was ‘ready’ to launch nuclear war, ‘even if it meant global annihilation’.[4]  The much vaunted British ‘stiff upper lip’ seemed to be an illusion. Some of the more extreme statements have naturally caused a number of normally phlegmatic Russian leaders some understandable irritation. For example, on 7 October 2024, Medvedev called for the sinking of Great Britain. Emotion and frustration seem to be taking over, but especially on the British side. Let us now try to understand it all. 

Pitt’s Imperial Anger and the Beginning of Russophobia 

Known as one of England’s most bellicose prime ministers, William Pitt the Younger, saw the Ottoman Empire as England’s buffer against Russian attempts to control the Dardanelles. Thus, in 1791, he lambasted Russia for wishing divide up the Ottoman Empire.[5] Apart from the obsession with keeping Russia out of the Dardanelles, defeating Russian designs in Asia emerged as the obsessive goal of generations of British civilian and military officials.[6] As for Queen Victoria, she referred to the ‘Great Game’ as ‘a question of Russian or British supremacy in the world.’[7] 

The Great Game 

Although England was to join Russia against Napoleon, this co-operation was to prove short-lived. Once the traditional military enmity between France and England had been cleared up in 1815, it was back to Russia-bashing and the ‘Great Game’. Germany, Britain’s future rival, was not yet united. England, and then Britain’s, essential policy for Europe was not to allow any European power to control the European Continent. Matters are the same today, and explain Britain’s push for EU enlargement, so as to have so many members as to render the Franco-German axis impotent in the face of Poland and the Baltic statelets, on top of the administrative burden in managing a such an unwieldy mass of states. Britain’s support for NATO enlargement also detracts from any serious Franco-German push for an EU army independent of NATO. 

British leaders feared that Russia did not know where to stop; and, as an increasingly democratic society engaged generation after generation in the conflict with ‘despotic’ Russia, they eventually developed a hatred of Russia that went beyond the particular political and economic differences that divided the two countries. Britons grew to object to Russians not merely for what they did but for who they were.[8]

The Straits 

Behind this lay England’s, and then the UK’s, anger that Russia’s push into lands previously taken over by the Ottomans threatened their access to India, but also English control of the Mediterranean, via Gibraltar, and later (see below) Cyprus. Hence England’s fear that Russia would invade Constantinople, and thereby control the Straits. This explains Britain’s friendship with the Ottomans. It was to become an obsession with British leaders: in 1841, the British Minister to Greece said: ‘A truly independent Greece is an absurdity. Greece can either be English or Russian, and since she must not be Russian, it is necessary that she be English’.[9] This appears as pure arrogance towards Greece, whose people Britain treated as geopolitical fodder. It is possible that officials such as Lyons were still smarting from the fact that it was Russia which had forced Britain into agreeing to at least a sovereign (albeit beholden to the ’Powers’) Greek state. Britain had pushed for a Greek ‘autonomous’ state, but as an Ottoman vassal. Greece owes its relative freedom to Russia more than to any other country, and certainly not to London (although revolutionary and Napoleonic France also have an intellectual claim), and it was despite, not because of, England, that the 1821 revolution ended in a form of – albeit qualified – independence. The Anglo-Russian Protocol of 4 April 1826 decided matters: it stipulated that Britain would mediate to make Greece an autonomous vassal of the Ottoman Empire, but that if this proved impossible, Britain or Russia could intervene jointly or separately. Russia intervened, and by 1829, Greece, or at least some of it, was reasonably free. Britain was constrained to join in and play a more active role, in other words: ‘If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.’

The Crimea

Britain’s obsession (with French and Piemontese help) with keeping Russia away then manifested itself in the Crimean War, when Russian was unable to take Constantinople and establish its navy in the Black Sea. But Russia, weakened but not on its back, began to revitalise itself, defeating the Ottomans in 1877, gaining some previously ceded territories, with Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania being able to throw off the Ottoman yolk. The resulting treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottomans made the Crimean khanate independent of the Turkish sultan; advanced the Russian frontier southward to the Southern (Pivdennyy) Buh River; gave Russia the right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea; and assigned Russia rights of protection over the Ottoman sultan’s Christian subjects.[10]

This was anathema to Britain, which feared a large Russia-friendly Bulgaria extending to, and including, Thessaloniki (to the anger of Greece), which then pushed for a revamp at the Congress of Berlin, where Bulgaria was again cut down to size, with Thrace and Macedonia remaining in Ottoman hands. To Russian, but especially French anger, Britain concluded a secret agreement with the Ottomans to rent Cyprus.

Cyprus

The Great Eastern Crisis demonstrated British concerns about a large pro-Russian Bulgaria, and marked the entry of Cyprus into the geopolitical equation. The British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, wrote: ‘If Cyprus can be conceded to your majesty by the Porte, and England at the same time enters into defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region and your Majesty’s Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia.’ [11]

Clearly, Britain’s acquisition of Cyprus betrayed its obsession with supporting the crumbling Ottoman Empire to the detriment of Russia. At any rate Britain’s possession of Cyprus remains to this day, through its military bases, there because of the geopolitical and emotional obsession with Russia. Fast forward to 1904/5, and the Russo-Japanese War. Britain had concluded an agreement with Japan in 1902, which egged it on against Moscow, hence the Russo-Japanese War.

Mackinder’s Geopolitical Obsession and the Poisoning of Geography

Although the term ‘geopolitics’ only came into fashion with the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), the founding father of geopolitical thinking is considered to be the German, Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904). Be that as it may, grabbing the resources of others has been an unfortunate human trait since time immemorial. It is only with 19^th century imperial doctrines that the crude term appeared, as an attempted justification of imperialism. Unlike the German Haushofer, who used the term ‘Geopolitik’ to justify the Nazi’s eastward expansion, the Englishman Halford Mackinder called it ‘political geography’, thus poisoning what had been a decent science. His obsession lay in keeping Russia divided from Germany and the rest of western Europe. Although the crude science of geopolitics had not been a subject of serious study in Russia or the Soviet Union (particularly since the vast nation has more than enough resources of its own, and did not feel or entertain the need to go around the world taking other people’s resources), by the heady emotional days of the fall of the Berlin Wall, serious Russians were looking closely at the ‘science’. One leading academic put the thinking world of Russia in the picture, with a seminal article, from which it is worth quoting, and then commenting on, as it reflects serious late-in-the-day Soviet thinking, and is valid today. The author (Igor Malashenko) begins by informing his – obviously educated – audience, that ‘Geopolitics, as the term suggests, is the politics of a country as determined by its geographical features.’ He then refers to Mackinder’s reference to Russia as occupying a central position on the world’s map, lying in its key region, the Heartland. He goes on to state, rather more thoughtfully than a typical mapmaniac, that the confrontation of the continental power which controls the heart of Eurasia and the coalition opposing it is by no means confined, geopolitically, to a contest between East and West, socialism and capitalism (or “totalitarianism” and “liberal democracy”, in Western parlance), as it has quite often been made out over the last few decades, but is an element of genuinely global politics. Properly speaking, the very terms “East” and “West” also reflect in a way, if inadequately, the fact that it is not only ideological rivalry or even a clash of social-political systems but also a “deideologized” geopolitical confrontation. ‘For centuries’, he writes, ‘Russia was beating off the West’s numerous attempts at establishing control over Eastern Europe, as through the expansionism of Lithuania, Poland, France or Germany. There appeared to be only one way to assure the security of Russia and the key region belonging to it: it was by raising a well-defended geopolitical barrier around it, brick by brick, block by block. This task arose over and over again before various rulers, dynasties and even geopolitical systems. The creation of the Empire was a response to the geopolitical challenge of the West.’ [12]

While Mackinder’s obsession lay in undermining friendship between Russia and Germany (including Western Europe), Malashenko also refers to ‘ethnopolitics’, in other words hostility toward the Russian people as a whole, rather than simply the government. Let us now briefly refer to Bolshevism.

Bolshevism as Russophobia

Britain’s traditional fear of Russian power was naturally enhanced, politically and emotionally (is there a big difference when it comes down to brass tacks?) when the Bolsheviks came to power. Serious British interference in Russia in 1919 and the early Twenties came to an abrupt end. Britain, but Winston Churchill in particular, did all she could to fight Bolshevism. Churchill is reputed to have described Soviet diplomats as ‘treacherous, incorrigible, and unfit for civilized intercourse’.[13] Clearly referring to Bolshevism, he had also referred to the ‘schemes of the International Jews’, calling them a ‘worldwide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstitution of society’.[14] Like Germany, which has since the horrors of its treatment of Jews between 1934 and 1945, been kind to Israel, so, it must be said, has Moscow trodden a careful line, because of the Pogroms. In sum, Churchill’s and Britain’s distrust of ‘the International Jew’ transmogrified into fear of dislike of Bolshevism and by extension, of Russia. This was to be brought into full relief in, of all places, Greece.

Churchill, Stalin and Greece

Churchill’s ‘postage stamp’ agreement with Stalin in October 1944 gave Britain 90% control over Greece. What is less well known is that Moscow had already allowed London to take the lead several months earlier, and that the Foreign Office had admitted that if anyone was to be blamed for the strength of the Communists in Greece, it was Britain herself, and that the Soviet government had agreed to let Britain take the lead in Greece.[15] Yet despite this, Britain, but mainly Churchill, continued to sow divisions in Greece, the most obvious example being Churchill’s obsession in bringing back an unpopular king.[16] On top of that, Britain continued to stir up the flames, despite the agreement with Moscow. Although at the end of the day, Greek fought Greek in the civil war, the British rôle in helping to get it off the ground was nefarious, with the Head of the MI6 station in Athens playing a particularly nasty part.[17] Britain in fact ended up supporting the more pro-German Greeks against her erstwhile Resistance partners. This can be explained through Britain’s manic obsession with Moscow. In the words of Francis Noel-Baker, ‘Instead of making Greek resistance more moderate, more democratic, more truly representative of the mass of Greek opinion, we drove it to extremes. Instead of helping to strengthen E.A.M by encouraging non-communist elements to join, we tried to weaken its influence, to prevent it ‘monopolising’ the liberation movement, by aiding its political opponents. The nationalists we tried to use were just those people with whom German propaganda against the ‘red menace’ was most effective. And Göbbels was working day and night to prove that all resistance to the Germans was communist inspired. Little wonder that so many of our ‘nationalist’ friends turned frankly Quisling.[18]

Apart from Britain’s rôle in the Greek Civil War, she then handed Greece over to America, thus bringing the latter into the Balkans and stimulating the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’. (see below).

The Cold War post-1945

Having I hope established reasonably effectively that despite the agreement with Moscow, Britain fanned the flames in Greece to the extent that it even wished for a Cold War with Moscow, let us turn to the broader picture, as to who was most responsible for the post-1945 Cold War, by making some obvious points: first, the West rejected Moscow’s suggestion for a neutral Germany; second, the West convinced its population that after Communist governments had taken power in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, Moscow was intent on conquering all of western Europe (few serious Western politicians actually believed this in private); third, the establishment of the Brussels Treaty by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg worried Moscow, which already suspected that Germany (at least the Western occupied part) would be drawn in later; her suspicions about the West’s keenness to rearm Germany had already been proven correct by the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, with a particularly strong currency exchange rate. Moscow responded a few months later with the creation in its zone namely the German Democratic Republic; fourth, NATO’s coming into being in 1949 worried Moscow yet more. Yet when the Soviet Union tried to join NATO (in March 1954), she was summarily rejected. It was therefore hardly surprising that the Warsaw Pact was established the following year.

Britain was at the forefront of anti-Soviet (and, emotionally anti-Russian) moves with, perhaps oxymoronically, Socialist British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin taking over the reins from Anthony Eden on 27 July 1945, almost coinciding with Harry Truman’s taking over the American presidency on 12 April. Bevin’s and Truman’s hatred of Communism (one of the reasons he dropped two atom bombs on Japan was to ‘show the Soviets’) resulted in the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’, in the form of massive military support to Greece and Turkey. Thus, British action in handing Greece to America was a vital ingredient of the Cold War which, with NATO’s establishment, had begun in earnest, with both Greece and Turkey joining in 1952. Despite Moscow’s attempts to join NATO, the die had been cast.[19] Perhaps if Franklin Roosevelt had not died when he did, British Churchillian and then Bevinian fear, bordering on hatred, of Russia, would not have won the day. At any event, Moscow’s suspicions that the West wished to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany proved to be well-founded when, following the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French Assemblée Nationale in August 1954, the Federal Republic joined NATO.[20]

Breathing Space

We have seen how England and then Britain did their utmost not only to rival Russia, but to work against it whenever the opportunity presented itself. Two important ingredients were Britain’s almost constant support for the Ottoman Empire and the ‘Great Game’. Fast forward to today, and the fall of the Berlin Wall: far from sticking to its word and not expanding NATO up to Russia’s borders, neither Britain nor the US took Russia’s wish to join NATO seriously.[21] Even after NATO’s illegal 78-day bombing of Belgrade – or perhaps because of it – Putin was prepared to make overtures.[22] But then came the West’s illegal destruction of Iraq, based on a lie, and the destruction of Libya, with Britain playing a leading rôle. The West’s attempt to destabilise and then indulge in ‘regime’ change in Syria proved to be almost the last straw for Moscow. The very last straw was ‘Maidan’ in 2014, when the Ukraine’s elected president was forced out by pro-NATO elements. This is the context which helps to explain Moscow’s ‘special military operation’. `It is hardly surprising that Moscow distrusts the West, Britain in particular.

Conclusions

This article mentioned in the introduction that individual characteristics such as atavism, nostalgia, arrogance, , envy, racism and what we term ‘post-imperial rigor mortis’ are key factors in explaining the English and then British attitude. Here we can refer to the above-mentioned emotional statements by the likes of Truss, Johnson and Lammy. Let us also quote the somewhat supercilious attitude of past British leaders toward the peoples of the world, Russia included:  Sir Francis Younghusband (famous for having led the invasion of Tibet in 1904) wrote: ‘Our superiority over them [Indians] is not due to mere sharpness of intellect, but to the higher moral nature to which we have attained in the development of the human race.’[23] Not to be outdone, a Liberal (!) Member of Parliament, Sir Charles Dilke, considered America as the agent of Anglo-Saxon domination, predicting a great racial conflict from which ‘Saxendom would rise triumphant’ with China, Japan, Africa and South America soon falling to the all- conquering Anglo-Saxon, and Italy, Spain, France and Russia ‘becoming pygmies by the side of such people’.[24] Then we have the revered explorer, mining magnate and politician Cecil Rhodes: ‘I contend that we are the finest race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race. Just fancy those parts that are at present inhabited by the most despicable specimens of human beings what an alteration there would be if they were brought under Anglo-Saxon influence, look again at the extra employment a new country added to our dominions gives.’[25] 

While it may seem slightly infra dig to harp on about past attributes of some English/British leaders, this cannot entirely disappear, and atavism should be given its due. For example, the rumbustious and often emotional Boris Johnson, himself only partly British, with a Turkish grandfather, and born in America, has cultivated a quintessentially ‘English’ image, which wears thin with real unassuming gentlemen. Johnson, who was sacked from The Times early in his career for inventing a quote, eventually had to resign his leadership of the Conservative Party after a series of scandals. Envy should also be given its due. Given that Russia never needed to grab the biggest known overseas empire, she never had an overseas one to lose. And when Britain lost most of its empire, and was reduced to a tiny area compared to that of Russia, it is possible that some of Britain’s more jingoistic leaders had a bout of atavistic envy. Post-imperial rigor mortis can be a dangerous factor in inter-state relations. 

As we begin to tie up this article, I quote a Russian friend’s comments on current leaders: ‘Reason is dead. It’s all about interests and primitive instincts these days. I can’t really figure out what’s the underlying problem behind that, but I start to think education matters. Education produces self-interested individuals with low moral standards, people don’t know their own history, total absence of critical thinking.  The current generation of leaders are mere individualistic bureaucrats who see their national interests through the same lenses as it were a company that needs to outmanoeuvre their competitors.’  

While it is true that the dumbing down of, especially, Higher Education in Britain, has indeed produced some rather mediocre intellects, it is also true that the more anti-Russian of current British leaders influence the general population. This of course not a new phenomenon: ‘To begin with, the era of free speech is closing down. The freedom of the press in Britain was always something of a fake, because in the last resort, money controls opinion.’[26] 

The Cold War was, and is, largely about hard-nosed business interests and the obsessional side of geopolitics (i.e. arming NATO member states to the profit of shareholders, and invading weaker counties illegally). Ideology, and now, even racism, were and are merely manufactured socially engineered excuses. As this article has tried to show, it all boils down to mediocre leadership. Let us end on a melancholic note: according to its founder, Britain’s only balalaika orchestra is struggling for members partly because of anti-Russian sentiment within the UK.[27]

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