Introduction
Greece’s demographic problem is the most important the country faces, as its consequences extend to all important aspects of state life: the size and dynamics of the population, the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the state, economic efficiency, intergenerational balance, social harmony, and preservation of a distinct way of life. For decades Greece, as almost all other countries of the Western world, has been facing an acute demographic crisis which has only gotten worse in the last period. Demographic ageing with fewer and later births and an ever-growing ratio of older people to younger ones has become the new pattern of population realities across Europe, North America, and East Asia. The case of Greece, a historical country with one of the most ancient nations, is a characteristic example. Now, in the midst of intensifying geopolitical insecurity in an often volatile international environment and after a ten-year long fiscal crisis that has further weakened the demographic basis of the country, Greece tries to address the demographic issue with mid-term solutions and institutional reforms. But are these measures enough to reverse the demographic decline or should there be a more comprehensive policy that shall embrace all aspects of Greece, ideological, cultural, economic, and social?
The demographic decline over the last decades
Greece’s historical population has featured only limited increase, from 6.2 million in 1928 to 10.5 in 2021 with a decreasing tendency over the last decades. According to the official data of the National Census of 2021 conducted by the Hellenic Statistical Authority the population of Greece amounts to 10,482,487 people.[1] Women amount to 5,356,510 and make up 51.1% of the general population, while men are 5,125,977 amounting to 48.9% of the general population. This marks a considerable decrease of the general population of 383,805 people or by 3.5% compared to the previous National Census of 2011.[2]
The total fertility rate of Greece – the average number of children that are born to a woman over her lifetime- is one of the lowest globally, just 1.32, well below the replacement level (2.1 children, so that there is substitution of generations). In the 20th and early 21st centuries, the total fertility rate of Greece has been reduced on a macro-historical perspective with periodical fluctuations, from 5.35 in 1901 to 4.09 in 1911, 3.19 in 1941, 2.47 in 1951, reaching its latest peak of 2.57 in 1971, before beginning its downward spiral over the next decades. From 1982 the annual fertility rate was steadily reduced below the replacement level of 2.1 and has since been fluctuating in the 1.3-1.5 range and reaching the negative score of 1.33 in 2023. The fertility patterns of Greece are in general alignment with the situation in the European Union,[3] where for 2022 according to Eurostat data fertility ranged between a minimum of 1.12 (Spain) to a maximum of 1.79 (France), always below the 2.1 replacement level.[4]
In comparison to the 2011 National Census, out of the 13 regions of Greece, 12 saw a decrease in population, while in only one region, in the South Aegean, was there an increase. [5] An overview of births over the last decades shows their dramatic decline between the periods 1979-1983 and 2014-2019, when they fell by 37%, with the negative pattern continuing into 2024.[6] During the immediate post-war period, in the 1950s and 1960s, when Greece was in a much more difficult economic situation than today, and despite the high rate of emigration, births were relatively stable amounting to 150,000 annually. Since the 1980s births reduced reaching 100,000 during the 1990s and being further reduced in the recent decades. Characteristically enough, in 2023 the country recorded the lowest number of births in 93 years with just 72,244 births.
Demographic projections of Greece’s population paint a bleak picture for the coming decades of the 21st century. If the current patterns of low fertility and emigration continue, it is estimated that the Greek national population will shrink to 9.6 million in 2050 and 7.45 million in 2100. The dramatic demographic situation of Greece has not escaped the attention of international media or even pioneering figures, as Elon Musk, who tweeted on X: ‘’Greece is one of the dozens of countries experiencing a demographic collapse due to low birth rates.”[7]
Concerning the spatial distribution of the population across the territory, there is an unequal concentration of a large part in the region of Attica where Athens, the administrative capital, is located. The population of Attica is estimated at 3,814,064 people, thus amounting to 36.3 of the general population.[8] The disproportionate overconcentration of people in Attica is in itself a serious structural problem, as it hinders attempts to develop not only the countryside, but also in an analogous manner other urban centers of Greece. The intense process of post-war urbanization has led to patterns of uneven dispersion of population throughout the territory, while the predominance of Athens has further exacerbated the demographic balance between center and periphery. The second issue is the extremely unequal spatial distribution of the population in terms of the whole territory. Almost half the population resides in just 66 municipalities out of a total of 1,036. More specifically, 56.6% of the general population -5.9 out of 10.5 million- resides in just 100 residential settlements out of a total of 13,586 across the national territory. It is also characteristic that 2,172 settlements feature less than 10 residents each, with 838 of them having not a single permanent resident. These almost deserted settlements are small, largely depopulated villages in the provinces of the continental mainland which have been steadily seen their once vibrant communities and local economies shrink to oblivion due to low fertility, emigration abroad, migration towards the urban centers or societal meltdowns.
Fig. 1: Total fertility rates in Europe, 2022 [Source: Eurostat]
Fig. 2: Population of Greece, 1928-2021 [Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority]
Fig. 3: Total fertility rate of Greece, 1800-2022
Figure 4: Birth rate of Greece, 1950-2021 [Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2022]
Figure 5: Death rate of Greece, 1950-2021 [Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2022]
Causes and consequences of the demographic decline
The demographic decline of Greece over the last decades is caused by a variety of factors that interact between themselves: historical, social/economic, and ideological/cultural. The historical factor is related to Greece’s geopolitical trajectory and its tumultuous past. The 1940s especially were a traumatic period for Hellenism. Greece was occupied in WWII by the Axis powers experiencing a devastating famine in Athens, a systematic destruction of its national wealth and later on a bloody civil war (1944-1949) that led to the desolation of the provincial regions. As a result, by 1950, Greek population was short by 10% of the expected total. According to estimates due to high mortality, forced emigration and the subsequent curtailed fertility, Greece actually lost 840,000 persons including both missing ones and those never born. As the economic situation in post-war Greece in the 1950s and 1960s remained precarious, Greek authorities encouraged emigration of a great part of its population towards developed countries, like the US, Australia, and West Germany. During the period 1961-1977 1,044,753 persons emigrated permanently, while an additional 1,075,007 persons emigrated temporarily.[9] Taking into account that Greece’s general population during the same period amounted to 7.6 million (1951 census), this was a huge demographic blow and obviously an enormous political mistake by Greek political authorities of the time. The emigrants were young people with the result that Greece lost a great percentage of its youthful and dynamic population and experienced a significant drop in births.
The social/economic factors of the demographic decline include structural changes in individual preferences, participation of women in the labor market which features negative correlation with fertility and the general economic situation and expectations of individuals. The economic factor is related to uncertainty about social status and the very decision to start a family. In many analyses, the drastic reduction of fertility is often attributed to the recent Greek economic crisis (2010-2019), a collective seminal event that changed Greek self-perception leading to fiscal austerity, emigration, and non-reproductive tendencies among the younger cohorts of the population. Although this correlation holds some basis, the downward spiral of Greek fertility patterns has steadily unfolded over the last decades and is the result of deeper structural patterns. This brings us to the last and most important factor of the demographic decline, the social and cultural aspect.
Cultural references, including religiosity or a sense of principled set of values, also bears positive correlation with fertility rates. Fertility is not intricately linked to the economic status, but mainly to lifestyle choices and cultural values. The high fertility of Mormons –a rich community- in Utah State of the US or of middle- and upper-class families in Europe from the 16th to the late 19th century, is a testimony to that. The ideological and cultural factor consists of the recess of religiosity among European populations especially in the decades after 1960 when a fundamental shift in mentalities prevailed in Western societies with an emphasis on consumerism, individualism, and hedonism. The influence of lifestyle choices on fertility rates is also essential, as avoiding bearing children, delayed childbearing and postponed reproduction are all related to loss of fertility, while the disruption of the historical perception of family in its traditional form as a couple bearing children has also contributed to population decrease. The wide use of abortions and the reluctance to dissociate the issue from ideological overtones in favor of the protection of the lives of unborn children has further undermined the demographic survival of European nation-states, in our case Hellenism.
The negative consequences of the demographic decline are multiple. Demographic ageing of a society causes many challenges that affect the whole spectrum: the reduction of the working age population and therefore of the dependency ratio with implications for taxation and intergenerational harmony;[10] high amounts for pensions; an increased demand for social services for the elderly, such as healthcare. An ageing society will typically feature low levels of innovation, as the necessary demographic pool will be absent. A relatively small population in itself will also feature fewer cases of distinct human capital with negative implications for future development. The steady increase in life expectancy combined with low fertility rates shall inevitably continue to increase the dependency ratio. In this scenario, the negative consequences will extend to the preservation of a reliable army force, as Greece is one of the few European countries that rely on army draft with mandatory military service.
Policy proposals to combat the demographic decline
In the context of the general situation, what can be done to overcome the demographic crisis that can assume characteristics of an existential challenge for the very existence of the Greek nation? The experience of other countries that have attempted to combat demographic decline is essential in this regard. Demographic policies work on a mid- and long-term level and only after considerable steps have been introduced and implemented for a long period of time, policies stabilized and accepted as societal norms and mentalities altered. Successful cases of demographic policies include Israel which has raised its population from 1.3 million in 1948 to 9.96 million in 2024 and its total fertility rate over the last decades, especially among the Jewish population.
In Greece, so far there has never appeared a comprehensive demographic policy that will address this fundamental issue in an organized, multi-disciplinary and most importantly long-term perspective focusing on the necessity to increase the population to a specific set goal. Policies introduced so far have been fragmented, disrupted, and are even plagued with contradictory notions, as they do not follow the purely demographic rationale, but sometimes serve unrelated agendas. The answer to Greece’s acute demographic crisis has to be multifaceted and rely on a comprehensive and thorough plan that we identify here as Demographic Revival of Hellenism. Such a project would set intermediate and long-term goals that could include raising the general population to 12 million until 2075 and to 15 million until 2100, with an even more ambitious goal of imagining a 20-million Greek nation during the early 22nd century. This project should extend in all aspects of society in internal Greek politics and should also cover of Greek foreign policy considering that a large part of the Greek nations resides abroad, and could include the following aspects:
- A change in mentalities, with an emphasis on family. This aspect is the most essential, because after all raising a family is a conscious choice on behalf of a married couple, not just some societal mechanics that shall unfold automatically. Pro-natalist policies according to an organized project include above all the encouragement of raising a family from an early age and having many children, desirably at least 2 and preferably 3 or more and issuing stricter lines for abortion procedures that shall protect the lives of unborn children. This change is according to our view the most fundamental, as its positive impact will unfold in the long-term, raising Greece’s total fertility rate and its population. Such a structural change of demographic patterns is also intricately connected to cultural values, economic stability, and residential choices, especially among the younger generations. An emphasis on community values, patriotism, close-knit family and kin ties instead of extreme individualism and consumerism leads to a larger population. Economic stability –discussed in detail in the next paragraph- is essential for the very decision to start a family. Lastly, residential choices also affect the demographic patterns, as life in the periphery, the provinces or small cities leads to a bigger fertility rate. This aspect is again connected to cultural values, as these factors overlap and interact. Institutional novelties of liberal societies, such as the introduction of other forms of marriage or cohabitation,[11] have undermined the principle of marriage itself as a union with the purpose of raising a family and as the bedrock of historical and societal continuity with intergenerational succession.
- Economic incentives to raise families. The Greek state has attempted to address the issue of the demographic decline mainly with interventions in the economic sector. In September 2024, the Greek government announced the introduction of government subsidies for families producing children, as well as the equation of families with 3 children to multi-children families leading to tax cuts and a variety of benefits in the public sector. Still, these measures have not been well thought out and suffer from a reactive logic to an ever aggravating problem, rather than be pro-active policies ensuring a stable demographic future based on married couples with a lot of children. Encouragement of fertility should focus on young couples with women in their 20s and early 30s, as this increases the prospects of having many children. Greece needs a steady Total Fertility Rate that shall not only raise its extremely low 1.32 level, but in due time also surpass the necessary minimum 2.1 limit. Encouragement of raising children should even adopt a national salary for stay-at-home mothers who do not take part in the typical working force recognizing their great contribution to societal continuity. A new perception of mothers as valued members of the society with a contribution that is morally even superior to a typical working individual can assist in this regard and will be the most decisive factor in raising total fertility rate.
- Encouragement of repatriation for ethnic Greeks living abroad. There are many communities of Greek ancestry and heritage located outside Greece. Greek migrant communities are lively and dynamic in many countries, especially in the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Germany, and recently in the EU. Overall, there are approximately 4 million Greeks living abroad (the figure does not include the ethnic Greeks in historical Greek space, i.e. the ethnic Greeks of Cyprus Republic, the National Greek Minority in Northern Epirus (southern Albania) and the Greeks in Turkey. During the economic crisis of the 2010s many young Greeks emigrated, mostly towards other European countries. In the late five years, there has been a tendency of repatriation, as the economic situation in Greece has considerably improved. Still, a large part of those late emigrants remains abroad opting for the better working conditions, salaries and welfare state of Northern European states. Changes in the bureaucratic structure of Greece, encouragement of creativity, market reforms, and an emphasis on meritocracy and the youth rather on middle-aged persons as is sometimes the norm in the Greek public sector could assist in completing the repatriation of young Greek citizens who left the homeland in the last 10-15 years.
- Re-imagining the Greek nation from a civic to a historical entity. The Greek nation is not just a civic entity like many modern nations in contemporary Europe. The Greek historical experience is not akin to the civic model of France, Belgium or the United Kingdom with populations sharing a common political identity based on a voluntary association and along almost exclusively political principles; instead, the Greek model of the nation is based on an ethnic and religious core and primordial, objective and quantifiable aspects of common historical traits that have persisted in the historical long durée. Back in the 5th century BC the Greek historian Herodotus had identified four elements as the common basis of the Greek nation which back then was politically divided into hundreds of competing city-states: ethnic origin, language, religion, and culture.[12] Herodotus’ definition of the Greek nation is still valid and relevant today, 2500 years later. Especially with its emphasis on Greek culture and the sense of historical continuity from the 2nd millennium BC, the Greek perception of the nation is closer to the civilizational model of China than the limited, often superficial civic model of Western European states. It is no coincidence that the latter have lately experienced the failure of their civic identities with considerable social tension among its increasingly diverse but not culturally united populations. The Greek nation can be perceived as an inter-state historical community with distinct and unique cultural, religious, features traversing the centuries and even spanning state territory. Greeks live in the Greek state (officially the Hellenic Republic), but they also live in the Cyprus Republic, an island in the Eastern Mediterranean with an ethnic Greek majority since the 16th century BC.
Therefore, in both academic analyses and political programs, we need to distinguish between the notions of ‘civic population’ and ‘historical population’.[13] This distinction is largely relevant only in Europe and other Western societies where there is increased fragmentation and contest between differing notions of identity, but is useful in navigating the complexities of modern states. A civic population of a state, often identified with the people, includes the citizens of the country, but also naturalized foreigners that can thus become members of the political community. Sometimes the naturalized persons bear no historical or cultural affinity with the ethnic core or the cultural sphere of the native historical population of the host country. A historical population, on the other hand, is the one that has founded the state itself as a spatial political entity and has formulated its fundamental historical and cultural references over the centuries. China and Greece are examples par excellence of historical populations and ancient civilizational states.
- Selective naturalization of migrants. Greece could continue its migration policies of naturalization of foreigners, as it has done in the recent decades since the 1990s when it became an immigration-receiving country. Naturalization is a way to increase the general population, although it comes with societal challenges and identity dilemmas.[14] European states today tend to preserve their demographic ratios on naturalization of foreign-born citizens and their descendants rather than on encouragement of raising the fertility rates of the native historical populations, especially since this very notion is absent from political discourse, as noticed above. This is a short-sighted view that does not take into account ancestry, culture, history, religion, customs, perceptions, and the need for the historical ancestral continuity of the ethnic core of European societies and in our case, of the Greek nation. Greek naturalization of migrants should be limited to foreigners sharing cultural affinity with the historical Greek population so as not to alter the historical ethnic core and religious and cultural homogeneity of the Greek nation and to secure successful integration into centuries-old cultural norms and values. A new mentality and self-perception of European societies would alleviate some of the negative consequences of demographic ageing, such as an emphasis on family, youth, and a rationalization of the European social model which often features excessive social welfare costs with high government expenditure. A moratorium on non-European immigration towards the EU would also contribute towards a rationalized understanding of population growth as inherently combined with raising the total fertility rate of the historical populations of Europe, instead of opting for gradual population replacement and alterations in historical ancestry.
Conclusions
The Greek demographic crisis is the direst problem Greece as a state and Hellenism as a historical community shall face in the coming decades of the 21st century. The patterns of demographic behavior in contemporary Greece are unfortunately negative leading so far to a vicious circle of low fertility, inadequate protection of the historical concept of family, and continuing emigration among the younger cohorts of the population. Before everything, a fundamental change in mentalities is urgently needed if the issue is to be addressed effectively and in a long-term perspective, in accordance with national needs and societal cohesion. The Greek nation is the oldest European nation with its language spoken continuously for more than 4000 years in the Greek homeland. The adoption of a comprehensive program for the continuity of its demographic core is of the utmost importance and the first recommended priority for the Greek authorities. Measures adopted may vary, but the goal ahead has to be clearly and precisely defined; it amounts to the very survival of the historical Greek nation with its inherited unique identitarian characteristics in its ancestral territorial homeland.
[1] Hellenic Statistical Authority, Census Results of Population and Housing 2021, Athens 2023, https://elstat-outsourcers.statistics.gr/census_results_2022_en.pdf.
[2] Hellenic Statistical Authority, Census Results of Population and Housing 2021, 8-9.
[3] The ESHRE Capri Workshop Group, ‘Europe the continent with the lowest fertility’, Human Reproduction Update 16:6 (11-12/2010), 590–602, https://doi.org/10.1093/humupd/dmq023.
[4] Eurostat, Fertility statistics, 2/2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics.
[5] Karolina Tagaris, The losing battle against Greece’s tumbling birthrate, Reuters, 10/4/2024, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/greece-birthrate/.
[6] Vyron Kotzamanis & Vassilis Pappas, One out of three regional unities in our country feature less than 10 births annually, Institute of Demographic Research, 9/2024, https://indemography.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Focus1_2024.pdf.
[7] Elon Musk, X, 14/4/2024, https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1779844281781322004.
[8] Hellenic Statistical Authority, Census Results of Population and Housing 2021, 48-51.
[9] Dimitrios Trichopoulos & George Papaevangelou, The Population of Greece, CICRED, Athens 1974, 14 (Table 1.3), http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c-c19.pdf.
[10] The dependency ratio typically measures the number of dependents aged 0 to 14 and over the age of 65, compared with the total population aged 15 to 64 (age of retirement is now 67 in Greece). The number should be adjusted to 0 to 18 or even 20, as just a limited number among the young enter the labor market due to mass enrollment in the tertiary education.
[11] Kostas Rontos, ‘Marriage or Cohabitation? A Survey of Students’ Attitudes in Greece’, Demografia 60:5 (2018), 5-31, doi: 10.21543/DEE.2017.1.
[12] Herodotus, Histories VII 144.1.
[13] Ioannis E. Kotoulas, History and Geopolitics of Modern Greece, Athens: Leimon, 2019, 163-164 [in Greek].
[14] Ioannis E. Kotoulas, ‘Macro-historical Causes of Modern Mass Migration’, Civitas Gentium 7:2 (2019), 113-123.
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